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“Mr. Davis: May it please the Court, I suppose there 
are few invitations less welcome in an advocate’s life than 
to be asked to reargue a case on which he has once spent 
himself, and it is particularly unwelcome when the order 
for reargument gives him no indication whatever of the 
topics in which the Court may be interested. Therefore, 
I want at the outset to tender the Court my thanks and, 
I think, the thanks of my colleagues on both sides of the 
desk for the guidance you have given us by the series of 
questions to which you have asked us to devote our atten­
tion. In what I shall have to say, I hope to indicate the 
answers which, for our part, we give to each one of them.
At the previous hearing of this case I think all counsel 
on both sides of the controversy, and in every case, realizing 
that it was an act of mercy, and perhaps even of piety, not to 
increase the reading matter that comes to this Court, briefed 
the case in rather concise fashion. An effort was apparent, 
and I am sure I shared it, to condense the controversy to the 
smallest compass it would bear. Now, for a rough guess I 
should think the order for reargument has contributed
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2somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 pages to the possible 
entertainment, if not the illumination, of the Court. But 
I trust the Court will not hold counsel responsible for this 
proliferation.
Most of us have supported our answers to the Court’s 
questions by appendices addressed to the action of Congress, 
to the action of the ratifying States, and in our particular 
case, to the history of the question within the State of 
South Carolina.
In view of the fact that his Honor, the Chief Justice, 
was not on the bench at the time of the other argument, 
perhaps I should outline the present posture of the South 
Carolina case of Briggs and Elliott. It was brought, as 
Mr. Robinson correctly stated, by infant Negro children in 
Clarendon County School District No. 22 (which, by a 
subsequent redistricting, became a part of District No. 1), 
by their parents and next friends, asserting that they were 
denied the equal protection of the laws on two grounds: 
First, that Section 7 of Article XI of the Constitution of 
South Carolina forbade integrated schools, commanded that 
the white and colored races should be taught in separate 
schools, and that the statute, in pursuance of that Con­
stitution, Section 5277 of their code, made a similar provi­
sion, and that both were in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States per se. 
Second, that, be that as it may, inequalities existed between 
the educational facilities furnished to the white and black 
children, to the detriment of the black. The State of South 
Carolina came in and admitted that those inequalities 
existed, and declared its intention to remove them as 
promptly as possible. Evidence was taken. The District
3Court decreed that the Constitution and statute of South 
Carolina did not violate the Amendment, found the exist­
ence of the admitted inequality, enjoined its immediate 
removal, and gave to the State of South Carolina the period 
of six months to report what steps had been taken to imple­
ment that decree.
At the end of that time a report came in which came to 
this Court and was returned to the District Court, and upon 
a second hearing, a further report came in. It was made to 
appear that the promise of the State of South Carolina to 
remove this inequality was no empty promise; that it had 
authorized—its legislature had authorized—a bond issue of 
$75 million to equalize the physical facilities of the schools, 
supported by a 3 per cent sales tax ; that the curricula had 
been equalized, the pay of teachers had been equalized, 
and transportation had been provided for children, white and 
black. The accuracy of those reports being admitted—and 
I am merely summarizing them—the court below held that 
it was clear that by the first of September, 1952, the inequal­
ities had disappeared. It then entered an order enjoining 
the further removal of such inequalities as might have 
existed, and declared the Constitution and the statute to be 
valid and non-violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We have in South Carolina a case, as Mr. Marshall has 
so positively admitted, with no remaining question of 
inequality at all, and the naked question is whether a separa­
tion of the races in the primary and secondary schools, 
which are the subject of this particular case, is of itself per 
se a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Now, turning to our answers, let me state what we say 
as to each one of them. The first question was: What
4evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and 
the State legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amend­
ment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or 
did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in 
public schools? We answer: The overwhelming prepon­
derance of the evidence demonstrates that the Congress 
which submitted and the State legislatures which ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not contemplate and did 
not understand that it would abolish segregation in public 
schools. In the time that is afforded, I hope to vindicate 
that categorical reply.
Our friends, the appellants, take an entirely contrary 
view, and they take it, in part, on the same historical testi­
mony. Certain fallacies underlie, I think, their course in 
reaching that conclusion. Some of them are apparent in 
their brief, but I have not found that they touched upon 
them in oral argument.
The first fallacy which appears in their brief, in their 
recounting of history, is the assumption, wholly unwar­
ranted, as I think, that the anti-slavery pre-Civil W ar cru­
sade, the abolitionist crusade, was directed not only against 
slavery but against segregation in schools. I do not think 
that thesis can be sustained, for the thrust and movement 
of the abolitionist crusade was directed toward one thing, 
and one thing only—the abolition of the institution of 
slavery. And from that nothing can be deduced which is 
helpful to the Court in its study of this section of history.
I think the next unjustified assumption, and again I am 
referring to my adversaries’ brief and not to their oral pre­
sentation, was that the radical Republicans controlled the 
action of the 39th Congress. That again is an unwarranted
5assumption. The radicals might force the pace; they were 
rarely able to call the tune. The 39th Congress never went 
as far as some of the radical Republicans wished it to go 
and, perhaps, there has never been a Congress in which the 
debates furnished less real pablum on which history might 
feed. It was what Claude Bowers calls in his book ‘The 
Tragic Era’—well-named. Flames of partisan passion 
were still burning over the ashes of the Civil War.
In the Senate there were such men as Sumner, who made 
a life-long crusade in favor of mixed racial schools. From 
the time that he was counsel for the plaintiff in Roberts v. 
Boston in ’49, he never missed an opportunity to bring the 
question forward, and never succeeded in having non-segre­
gation enacted into law, except by the legislature of Massa­
chusetts in 1855. There were men who stood with Sumner, 
for example, his colleague, Henry Wilson of Massachusetts. 
And on the other side equally capable men like Cowan of 
Pennsylvania, and Garrett Davis of Kentucky, and others, 
resented all of the Civil W ar reconstruction legislation, and 
whenever they had an opportunity to attack it, painted it in 
the blackest colors that they could devise.
In the House, Thaddeus Stevens, called by historians 
perhaps the most unlovely character in American history, 
was more concerned to humiliate the aristocrats of the 
South, as he called them, than to preserve the rights of the 
Negro. His policy was confiscation of all estates over 
$10,000 and two hundred acres, of which 40 acres should be 
given to every adult Negro, and the remainder should be sold 
to pay the expenses of the war. He wanted the South to 
come to Washington as suppliants in sackcloth and ashes. 
He had his echoes. On the other side there were resisters
6like Rogers of New Jersey, a Democrat from New Jersey, 
who never missed an opportunity to criticize every one of the 
bills that was presented on the ground that it would forbid 
segregated schools. That complaint came from Rogers al­
most as regularly as the contrary view came from Sumner.
Now, if I gather my friends’ position, both in brief and 
argument, they hope from the debates of such a Congress 
to distill clear, specific evidence of Congressional intent. I 
do not think that is possible; but there is a source from 
which Congressional intent can be gathered, far more re­
liable, far less open to challenge by anyone. What did the 
Congress do? And when we study the legislation enacted 
by Congress immediately before, immediately after, and 
during the period of the discussion of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, there can be no question left that Congress 
did not intend by the Fourteenth Amendment to deal with 
the question of mixed or segregated schools.
There is another fallacy in the presentation of the case 
by the appellants. They take for granted that if they can 
quote any Senator, Congressman, or other character in 
favor of racial equality, they can count him down in the 
column of those who were opposed to segregated schools, 
which is a clear nonsequitur and a begging of the question.
We are not concerned here with the mandate of the 
Constitution that the Negro, as well as the white, shall enjoy 
the equal protection of the laws. The question with which 
Your Honors are confronted is: Is segregation in schools 
a denial of equality where the segregation runs against one 
race as well as against the other, and where in the eye of 
the law no difference between the educational facilities of 
the two classes can be discerned ?
7Now, I think those remarks sum up most of what I care 
to say by way of direct reply to the argument of the appel­
lants.
There is a third point of view presented to Your Honors. 
We say the intent of Congress was clear not to enter this 
field. We say the intent of the ratifying States was equally 
clear, at least as to the majority of them, not to enter this 
field. The Attorney General is present, acceding to the 
invitation of the Court, with a brief, and a very large appen­
dix reciting the history of the legislation. He reaches the 
conclusion, or those who speak for him—I am not speaking 
in the personal sense but only of the office—he reaches the 
conclusion, as stated in his brief, that historical facts—I am 
having some trouble with my own chirography here and I 
wish my quotation to be exact—‘the historical facts are too 
equivocal and inconclusive to formulate a solid basis on 
which this Court can determine the application of the amend­
ment to the question of school segregation as it exists 
today.’ After so prolonged a study as has evidently been 
made, that does seem rather a lame and impotent conclusion, 
not calculated to be of a great deal of help to the Court; and 
I think the cause of that despair on the part of the learned 
Attorney General and his aids is that they have fallen into 
the same fallacy into which the appellants have fallen. They 
endeavor by collating all that was said on either side when­
ever the question raged—and it was not a single instance— 
they hope out of that to distill some attar that will exhibit 
what can fairly be called the Congressional intent. It is no 
wonder that, having plunged into that Serbonian bog, they 
are in a state of more or less despair when they are able to 
emerge.
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Now, Your Honors then are presented with this: We 
say there is no warrant for the assertion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment dealt with the school question. The appellants 
say that from the debates in Congress it is perfectly evident 
that the Congress wanted to deal with the school question. 
And the Attorney General, as a friend of the Court, says 
he does not know which is correct. So Your Honors are 
afforded a reasonable field for selection.
Now, we say that, whatsoever may have been said in 
debate—and there is not an angle of this case that would 
not find, if that were the decisive question, support in what 
some person might have said at some time—Congress by its 
action demonstrated beyond peradvanture what field it in­
tended to occupy.
I hoped at one time that it would be possible to take up 
each action of Congress upon which we rely and vindicate 
our interpretation of it. I see now that I underestimated the 
time that would be at my disposal, or overestimated my 
power of delivery. I shall have to speak more or less in 
words of catalog and leave to our brief and to our appendices 
confirmation of the relevancy of these incidents.
The 39th Congress passed the First Supplemental Freed­
men’s Bureau Bill, giving the Freedmen’s Bureau power to 
buy sites and buildings for schools for freedmen, refugees, 
and their children; and, of course, the freedmen and the 
refugees were of the colored race. There was provision that 
if certain cataloged rights were denied, military protection 
should be given. What was that catalog? To make and 
enforce contracts, sue, be sued, be a party and give evidence, 
inherit, purchase or dispose of real or personal property; 
have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
9the security of person and estate, and be subject to like pun ­
ishments, pains and penalties as with others, and none 
besides. What did the Freedmen’s Bureau do? It was the 
pet and child of Congress and, acting under its constant 
supervision, it installed separate schools throughout the 
South, so separate indeed that history records one complaint 
by the City of Charleston that they had seized, occupied and 
taken over all the school buildings in that city, filled them 
with their Negro wards, and the white children no longer 
had any buildings to which to resort.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the rights to be pro­
tected were cataloged almost in the identical language of 
the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, the difference being that the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill ran only in those States in which 
the process of the courts had been interrupted—which was 
a euphemism meaning those States that had been occupied 
by the Confederate and Federal armies—and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 was designed to be nation-wide. It is 
not surprising that its language conformed to the language 
of the Freedmen’s Bureau. They were both introduced at 
the same time by Senator Trumbull, the chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee of the Senate, and they made their 
way through Congress in much the same fashion.
After the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had passed the 
Senate, it went to the House for consideration. There it 
was introduced, sponsored, and discussed by Congressman 
James Wilson of Iowa, who was chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee. When Brother Rogers made his usual com­
plaint that it would do away with separate schools, Wilson 
said on the floor that the Act did not mean that their children 
should attend the same schools, and, in effect, that it was
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absurd so to interpret it. Now, the pertinency of that assur­
ance is due to the connection which counsel has stated be­
tween the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It was the constant claim of those who favored the Four­
teenth Amendment, Stevens and Sumner both speaking of 
it, that it was intended to make the Civil Rights Act not 
only constitutional (and so to quiet Congressman John 
Bingham’s doubt and conscience) but irrepealable so that, 
as Stevens said, whenever the Democrats and their Copper­
head allies came back to Congress, they would not be able 
to repeal it.
I will pass over, for the moment, some other legislation, 
which I will come back to, that occurred in the 39th 
Congress.
We come to the reinstatement of the seceded States. 
Congress passed an act by virtue of which they might, in 
compliance, send their Senators and Congressmen back. 
Now, in the 39th Congress, Sumner had put forward his 
prescription for their readmission. He had five headings 
for it, of which the fourth was this: That the seceding 
States, if they wished to return, should adopt constitutions, 
which among other things, would provide for the organiza­
tion of an educational system for the equal benefit of all, 
without distinction of color or race. The Reconstruction 
Act was adopted in the succeeding Congress and it called for 
a catalog of performances to be carried out by the States 
desiring readmission. Did they say anything about Sum­
ner’s educational plank? Not a word. Was any require­
ment made of the State as to educational provision ? None 
whatever.
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When they came to readmit the State of Arkansas, Sen­
ator Drake of Missouri offered an amendment in which he 
provided that the constitution of the petitioning State 
should provide no denial of the elective franchise or any 
other right. He offered that as an amendment to the bill 
admitting the State of Arkansas. Controversy arose as to 
the meaning of ‘any other right.’ Then it was asserted that 
there would enter the question of schools. It was stricken 
out, and the Drake Amendment adopted without it—and 
Senator Frelinghuysen, who had been a member of the 
39th Congress and was later to act as Senate floor leader 
for the Civil Rights Act of 1875, said that neither the 
Drake Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment touched 
the question of separate schools. That is one time when I 
think it is proper to quote from a debate.
There came then the amnesty bill amendments. Congress 
passed an amnesty bill. When it was before the Senate, 
Sumner offered his supplemental Civil Rights Bill, which 
provided expressly for mixed schools. The Judiciary Com­
mittee twice reported it adversely, and Sumner flanked 
them by offering it then as an amendment to the amnesty 
bill. In that form it was debated and, finally, a vote was 
taken which was 28 to 28, and the Vice President broke the 
tie in Sumner’s favor. It was the high-water mark of his 
achievement.
The amnesty bill, so amended, failed of passage in the 
Senate, where it needed a two-thirds vote under the terms 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. It failed of passage in the 
Senate and the Senate did nothing more with it. Then it 
went to the House, and the House failed to pass it. The
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weight of the Sumner Amendment was too much for the 
bill to carry.
Bills to require mixed schools in the District of Colum­
bia were defeated in the 41st and the 42nd Congresses.
Then came the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was 
passed only after the Kellogg Amendment, striking out the 
reference to schools, churches, cemeteries, and juries, was 
adopted.
In 1862 Congress had set up its first school for Negroes 
in the District of Columbia on a segregated basis. In 1864 
it dealt with that question again on a segregated basis. In 
1866, the 39th Congress made a donation of certain lots 
to be given to schools for Negroes only. It passed a second 
Act in the same Congress dealing with the distribution of 
funds between the Negro and the white schools. In 1868 
it dealt with the question again on the segregated basis, 
and has so continued to this day.
I know that Your Honors are shortly going to hear a 
case which challenges the validity of those statutes; and, 
be they valid or invalid, for the purpose of my present 
argument it is immaterial. They are enough to show what 
the sentiment of Congress was, what its determination was 
on this specific question. And it is no answer to say that 
Congress is not controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Of course, it is not; but is it conceivable to any man 
that Congress would submit to the States an amendment 
destroying their right to segregated schools and would con­
temporaneously and continuously institute a regime of segre­
gated schools in the District of Columbia? I should think 
that a Congressman who was responsible for submitting 
to the States an amendment shearing them of such power
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would have quite an explanation to make when he got home, 
if he said he had done exactly the reverse in the District 
of Columbia.
Then it is suggested in the brief for the learned Attorney 
General—and I think similar comment, perhaps, by the 
appellants—that these two instances in the 39th Congress, 
these two legislative recognitions of separate schools in 
the District, which were passed when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was taking form and substance, were mere 
routine performances; that they came very late in the Con­
gressional session; and that they were not even honored by 
having any debate. Apparently, to have a law which is 
really to be recognized as a Congressional deliverance, it 
must come early in the session, it must be debated, and 
the mere fact that it is passed by unanimous consent and 
without objection more or less disparages its importance 
as an historical incident. I have never, that I can recall, 
heard a similar yardstick applied to Congressional action.
There isn’t time to go over the States. They are covered 
by our appendix and these other appendices. We classify 
them, too.
We say that there are nine States that never had segre­
gated schools. These were States in the northern tier, 
where there weren’t enough Negroes to make it worthwhile. 
There were five States—I am speaking now of the 37 States 
that were then in existence—there were about five States 
where there had been segregation and they contemporane­
ously discontinued it. Those were Connecticut, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Florida and South Carolina. Three of those 
States returned to segregation as soon as the reconstruction 
period was over.
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There were four States that had segregation—I am 
speaking now of the period from ’66 when the Amendment 
was submitted to ’68 when it was proclaimed—there were 
four States with segregation who refused to ratify and con­
tinued segregation. They were California, Kentucky, Mary­
land and Delaware. Delaware didn’t ratify it until 1901.
There were two border States that had segregation both 
before and after ratification, and have continued it to this 
day. They are Missouri and West Virginia.
There were nine Northern States that either continued 
segregation they already had or established it immediately 
after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment—Illi­
nois, Indiana, Kansas, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, Oregon and Pennsylvania.
And then—and I can find no evidence that my friends 
appreciate the significance of this fact—of the reconstructed 
States who ratified in order to get their delegates, their 
Congressmen and Senators, back to Washington, eight re­
construction States, by the same reconstruction legislatures, 
Republican controlled—the same legislatures which ratified 
the Fourteenth Amendment— passed statutes continuing or 
immediately establishing segregated schools. I regard that 
as a fact of great significance. If there was any place where 
the Fourteenth Amendment and its sponsors would have 
blown the bugle for mixed schools and asserted that the 
Fourteenth Amendment had settled the question, surely it 
would have been in those eight States under reconstruction 
legislatures, sympathetic to the party which was responsible 
for the submission of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Now the appellants say in their brief that three fourths 
of the ratifying States gave evidence that they thought the
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Fourteenth Amendment had abolished segregated schools. 
I can find in the history as detailed by all of these appendices 
no warrant whatever for any such assertion, for any such 
proportion of non-concurring States. That is before Your 
Honors in the appendices, and you must, between the three 
points of view that I have indicated, make your selection.
The second question: If neither the Congress in sub­
mitting nor the States in ratifying the Fourteenth Amend­
ment understood that compliance with it would require the 
immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was 
it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the 
Amendment (a) that future Congresses might, in the exer­
cise of their power under Section 5 of the Amendment, 
abolish segregation, or (b), that it would be within the 
judicial power, in light of future conditions, to construe 
the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own 
force ?
And to that we answer (a) : It was not the understand­
ing of the framers of the Amendment that future Con­
gresses might, in the exercise of their power under Section 
5 of the Amendment, abolish segregation in public schools.
And (b) : It was not the understanding of the framers 
of the Amendment that it would be within the judicial power, 
in light of future conditions, to construe the Amendment as 
abolishing segregation in public schools of its own force.
It was not the understanding of the framers that Con­
gress might, in the exercise of their power under Section 
5 of the Amendment, abolish segregation. And if we are 
right in the initial proposition that neither Congress nor 
the States thought the Amendment was dealing with 
the question of segregated schools, obviously Section 5 of
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the Amendment could not give Congress more power than 
the Amendment itself had originally embraced. But the 
power given to Congress, we had noted in Section 5, is the 
power—I thought I had the exact language— ‘to enforce 
the provisions of this article’. And Section 5 is not a Trojan 
horse which opened to Congress a wide field in which Con­
gress might expand the boundaries of the article itself.
Mr. Justice Jackson: Mr. Davis, would not the neces­
sary and proper clause apply to the Amendment as well as to 
the enumerated powers of the instrument itself? In other 
words, if Congress should say that in order to accomplish 
the purposes of equality in other fields the abolition of 
segregation was necessary, as a necessary and proper 
measure, would that not come under it, or might it not 
come under the necessary and proper clause? In other 
words, I mean is it limited to just what is given in the 
Amendment or does the necessary and proper clause follow 
into the amendments?
Mr. Davis: Well, if you can imagine a necessary and 
proper clause which would enforce the provisions of this 
article by dealing with matter which is not within the scope 
of the article itself, which I think is a contradiction in terms, 
that is a paradox: Congress could do what the Amendment 
did not warrant under the guise of enforcing the Amend­
ment.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: But you can look to the neces­
sary and proper clause to determine whether it is something 
appropriate within the Amendment.
Mr. Davis: Quite so. That is, if you choose, a premoni­
tory clause, related to Congressional wisdom and policy,
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and to the judicial power. In answer to that question, we 
say that to interpret the Amendment as including something 
that it does not include is not to interpret the Amendment 
but is to amend the Amendment, which is beyond the power 
of the Court.
The third question: On the assumption that the answers 
to questions 2 (a) and (b) do not dispose of the issue, is it 
within the judicial power, in construing the Amendment, to 
abolish segregation in the public schools ? And we answer: 
It is not within the judicial power to construe the Fourteenth 
Amendment adversely to the understanding of its framers 
as abolishing segregation in the public schools. Before we 
answer, we preface that with an expression of the extreme 
difficulty we have in making the initial assumption on which 
that question is based, for in our humble judgment the 
answers to questions 1 and 2 (a) and (b) do dispose of the 
issue in this case and dispose of it in the clearest and most 
emphatic manner.
We go on in our answer: Moreover, if in construing 
the Amendment the principle of stare decisis is applied, con­
trolling precedents preclude a construction which would 
abolish segregation in the public schools. Now we are cog­
nizant of what this Court has said, not once but several 
times, and what some of us have heard outside the Court as 
to the scope of stare decisis in constitutional matters; and it 
has been accepted that, where there is a pronounced dissent 
from previous opinions in constitutional matter, mere diffi­
culty in amendment leads the Court to bow to that change 
of opinion more than it would in matters of purely private 
rights. But be that doctrine what it may, somewhere, some­
time, to every principle comes a moment of repose when the 
decision has been so often announced, so confidently relied
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upon, so long continued, that it passes the limits of judicial 
discretion and disturbance.
That is the opinion which we held when we filed our 
former brief in this case. We relied on the fact that this 
Court had not once but seven times, I think it is, pronounced 
in favor of the separate but equal doctrine. We relied on 
the fact that the courts of last appeal of some sixteen or 
eighteen States have passed upon the validity of the separate 
but equal doctrine vis-à-vis the Fourteenth Amendment. We 
relied on the fact that Congress has continuously since 1862 
segregated its schools in the District of Columbia. We re­
lied on the fact that 23 of the ratifying States—I think my 
figures are right, I am not sure—had by legislative action 
evinced their conviction that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was not offended by segregation. And we said in effect— 
and I am bold enough to repeat it here now—that, in the 
language of Judge Parker in his opinion below, after that 
had been the consistent history for over three quarters of a 
century, it was late indeed in the day to disturb it on any 
theoretical or sociological basis. We stand on that propo­
sition.
Then we go on: Even if the principle of stare decisis 
and controlling precedents be denied, and the effect of the 
Amendment upon public school segregation be examined de 
novo, the doctrine of reasonable classification would protect 
this doctrine from any charge that is brought against it.
In Clarendon School District No. 1 in South Carolina, 
with which this case alone is concerned, there were, in the 
last report that got into this record, something over a year 
or a year and a half ago, 2,799 registered Negro children 
of school age. There were 295 whites. And the State
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has now provided those 2,800 Negro children with schools 
as good in every particular. In fact, because of their 
being newer, they may even be better. There are good 
teachers and the same curriculum as in the schools for the 
295 whites.
Who is going to disturb that situation? If they were 
to be reassorted or commingled, who knows how that could 
best be done? If  it is done on a mathematical basis, with 
30 children to a room as a maximum, which I believe is the 
accepted standard in pedagogy, you would have 27 Negro 
children and 3 whites in one school room. Would that make 
the children any happier? Would they learn any more 
quickly ? Would their lives be more serene?
Children of that age are not the most considerate 
animals in the world, as we all know. Would the terrible 
psychological disaster being wrought, according to some 
of these witnesses, to the colored child be removed if he 
had three white children sitting somewhere in the same 
school room? Would white children be prevented from 
getting a distorted idea of racial relations if they sat with 
27 Negro children? I have posed that question because it 
is one that cannot be overlooked.
You say that is racism. Well, it is not racism to recog­
nize that for 60 centuries or more humanity has been dis­
cussing questions of race and race tension. Say that we 
make special provisions for the aboriginal Indian population 
of this country. It is not racism. Say that 29 States have 
miscegenation statutes now in force which they believe are 
of beneficial protection to both races. And what of racial 
distinctions in our immigration and naturalization laws? 
Disraeli said, ‘No man will treat with indifference the prin-
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ciple of race. It is the key to history.’ And it is not neces­
sary to enter into any comparison of faculties or possibilities. 
You recognize differences which race implants in the human 
animal.
Now, I want to spend some time on the fourth and fifth 
questions. They give us little disturbance, and I don’t feel 
they will greatly disturb the Court.
As to the question of the right of the Court to postpone 
the remedy, we think that inheres in every court of equity, 
and there has been no question about it as to power.
The fifth question is whether the Court should formulate 
a decree. We find nothing here on which this Court could 
formulate a decree. Nor do we think the Court below has 
any power to formulate a decree reciting in what manner 
these schools are to be altered, if at all, and what course 
the State of South Carolina shall take concerning it. Your 
Honors do not sit, and cannot sit, as a glorified Board of 
Education for the State of South Carolina or any other 
State. Neither can the District Court.
Assuming (in the language of the old treaties about war, 
‘it is not to be expected and may God forbid’) that the Court 
should find that the Statutes of the State of South Carolina 
violate the Constitution, it can so declare. If it should find 
that inequality is being practiced in the schools, it can enjoin 
its continuance. Neither this Court nor any other court, 
I respectfully submit, can sit in the chairs of the legislature 
of South Carolina and mold its educational system; and 
if it is found to be in its present form unacceptable, the 
State of South Carolina must devise the alternative. It 
establishes the schools, it pays the funds, and it has the 
sole power to educate its citizens. What it would do under
21
these adverse circumstances, I don’t know. I do know, if 
the testimony is to be believed, that the result would not 
be pleasing.
Let me say this for the State of South Carolina. It 
does not come here, as Thad Stevens would have wished, 
in sackcloth and ashes. It believes that its legislation is 
not offensive to the Constitution of the United States. It is 
confident of its good faith and intention to produce equality 
for all of its children of whatever race or color. It is con­
vinced that the happiness, the progress and the welfare of 
these children is best promoted in segregated schools, and 
it thinks it a thousand pities that, by this controversy, 
there should be urged the return to an experiment which 
gives no more promise of success today than when it was 
written into their Constitution during what we have called 
‘the tragic era’.
I am reminded—and I hope it won’t be treated as a 
reflection on anybody—of Aesop’s fable of the dog and the 
meat: The dog, with a fine piece of meat in his mouth, 
crossed a bridge and saw the shadow of the meat in the 
stream and plunged for it, and lost both substance and 
shadow.
Here is equal education, not promised, not prophesied, 
but present. Shall it be thrown away on some fancied ques­
tion of racial prestige?
it  is not my part to offer advice to the appellants and 
their supporters or sympathizers, and certainly not to the 
learned counsel. No doubt they think what they propose 
is best, and I do not challenge their sincerity in any par­
ticular, but I entreat them to remember the age-old motto 
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